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ABSTRACT Cultural evolution theory posits that a major factor in human ecological suc-
cess is our high-fidelity and selective social learning, which permits the accumulation of
adaptive knowledge and skills over successive generations. One way to acquire adaptive
social information is by preferentially copying competent individuals within a valuable domain
(success bias). However, competence within a domain is often difficult or impossible to
directly assess. Almost 20 years ago, Henrich and Gil-White (H&GW) suggested that people
use indirect cues of success (e.g., differential levels of attention paid to models by other social
learners) as adaptive short-cuts to select models from whom to learn. They called this use of
indirect markers of success prestige bias. In this review, we re-visit H&GW’s proposal,
examining the evidence amassed since for the adaptiveness and use of prestige bias in
humans. First, we briefly outline H&GW’s theory. Second, we analyse whether prestige is
associated with competence within valuable domains, which is a crucial assumption under-
lying the adaptiveness of prestige bias. Third, we discuss prestige cues that people use to
infer success (e.g., the amount of voluntary deference and attention received by models).
Fourth, we examine the evidence for and against the use of prestige bias in human adults and
children. Finally, we point out limitations in the current literature and present new avenues for
research on prestige bias.
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Introduction
Cultural evolution theory posits that a major factor inhuman ecological success is our high-fidelity and selectivesocial learning, which permits the accumulation of valu-
able knowledge and skills over successive generations. One of the
most cited types of selective social learning in the cultural evo-
lution literature is to copy the behaviours of individuals highly
respected and admired in a social group (i.e., prestigious indivi-
duals), known as prestige bias. Almost 20 years ago, Henrich and
Gil-White (henceforth H&GW) developed a theory of the evo-
lution of prestige. The distinctive features of this theory were the
consideration of prestige as an alternative route to dominance to
attain and maintain high social rank in humans and the relevance
attributed to social learning in the evolution of prestige (Henrich
and Gil-White, 2001). In this article, we focus on a crucial aspect
of H&GW’s theory: the adaptive value and actual use of prestige-
biased social learning in humans. In the following, we first outline
H&GW’s theory. Second, we analyse whether prestige is asso-
ciated with competence within valuable domains and older age.
Third, we discuss which types of first-order (e.g., age) and
second-order (e.g., the distribution of freely conferred deference)
cues of prestige people use to infer competence within a valued
domain. Fourth, we examine the evidence for and against the use
of prestige bias in human adults and children. Finally, we point
out limitations in the current literature and present new avenues
for research on prestige bias.
Social learning and the evolution of prestige
Following H&GW, social rank1 is defined as a hierarchy of
rewards and/or displays in which individuals at the top enjoy
privileges (e.g., preferential access to resources usually without
resistance from other in-group members), are influential, and
receive deference (i.e., manifestations of respect and submission
to their wishes). High social rank is generally desirable and is
positively associated with reproductive success in many societies
(Betzig, 1988; Chagnon, 1988; J. Hill, 1984; Mealey, 1985; von
Rueden et al., 2010; von Rueden and Jaeggi, 2016).
According to H&GW, people use, not necessarily consciously,
two distinct strategies to acquire and maintain high social rank:
dominance and prestige (see also Cheng and Tracy, 2014; Cheng
et al., 2013). The dominance strategy involves causing, or threa-
tening to induce, costs to other individuals. If the use of this
strategy is successful, this elicits fear in the other individuals, who
defer and submit to the wishes of the dominant individual to
avoid the potential costs. In contrast, the prestige strategy involves
displaying competence in valued domains. If the use of this
strategy is successful, this elicits admiration in other individuals,
who defer and submit to the wishes of the prestigious individual
in order to gain access to, and thus socially learn from, this
individual, and to acquire other benefits such as private and
public goods (Anderson and Kilduff, 2009a; Cheng and Tracy,
2014; Henrich, 2016; Price and Van Vugt, 2014; Von Rueden
et al., 2008). Although the successful use of both strategies leads
to receiving deference from other individuals, the key distinction
between them is that dominant individuals receive coerced
deference, while prestigious individuals receive voluntary (or
‘freely-conferred’) deference.
H&GW argue that the dominance strategy is phylogenetically
ancestral to our species. Humans share this strategy with non-
human primates (e.g., de Waal, 2000) and other social animals. In
contrast, H&GW believe that the prestige strategy is probably
unique to humans (but see Chapais, 2015; Garfield et al., 2018;
Horner et al., 2010; Kendal et al., 2015 for evidence of prestige in
non-human animals). This is because they assume that the evo-
lution of prestige required high-fidelity social learning, which is
arguably much more developed in humans than in other animals
(Herrmann et al., 2007; Tennie et al., 2009). According to
H&GW, the selective pressure that drove the evolution of prestige
was the need to identify individuals within a group (i.e., not only
kin) with “better-than-average” knowledge/skill from whom to
learn (but see Barkow, 1989, 2014; Chapais, 2015 for alternative
explanations for the evolution of prestige). Copying these indi-
viduals within domains such as medicinal plant knowledge or
hunting techniques would have led to the acquisition of fitness
enhancing knowledge/skills. However, directly inferring superior
knowledge/skill is often difficult or costly. For instance, accurately
assessing hunting skill is difficult when hunting highly dispersed
large-size game in fluctuating environments, in which the varia-
tion in caloric returns does not depend exclusively on hunting
skill (K. Hill and Kintigh, 2009). Under these circumstances, the
use of less direct but more readily available proxies for identifying
knowledgeable/skilful individuals is often adaptive. Such proxies
include the amount of copying, attention and deference (i.e., costs
paid in exchange for access to the model) that individuals freely
receive. These prestige cues act as indirect cues of success to select
models from whom to learn (Henrich, 2016).
H&GW also formulated a number of predictions derived from
their theory of the evolution of prestige, and their theory has
inspired a number of related predictions (Table 1, see also Table 2
for a full list of predictions derived from the present review).
Prestige, competence, and age
H&GW predict that knowledgeable/skilful individuals tend to
acquire prestige (prediction (i) in Table 1). This prediction is
based on their assumption that people defer to knowledgeable/
skilful individuals to obtain preferential access to them, and
consequently increase valuable social learning opportunities.
H&GW support their prediction with ethnographies that show
that prestige is associated with skill/knowledge in valued domains
such as hunting (e.g., Holmberg, 1969, pp. 144–145; Lee, 1979,
pp. 343–344), supernatural knowledge (e.g., Lee, 1979, pp.
343–344) or combat (e.g., Patton, 2000) in many foraging
societies. More formally, this association between prestige and
knowledge/skill has been supported by a recent study looking at
more than 1000 ethnographical texts on leadership pertaining to
60 cultures contained in the Human Relations Area Files (HRAF)
(Garfield et al. 2018). Moreover, H&GW assumed that prestige
and skill/knowledge in valued domains is also positively corre-
lated in modern post-industrial societies as for the case of male
adolescents conferring prestige to peers with high athletic skills
(Coleman, 1961, pp. 130–135). Similarly, H&GW predict that
older individuals have higher prestige than younger ones, as older
individuals have more experience in life and have had time to
accumulate greater knowledge and refined skills (prediction (ii) in
Table 1). They support this prediction with ethnographic evi-
dence (Maxwell and Silverman, 1970; Simmons, 1945/1970).
However, they do not mention modern post-industrial societies,
which makes it difficult to know whether they assume that this
correlation also holds in such societies.
Reyes-Garcia et al. (2008) tested these predictions with the
Tsimane, an indigenous population from the Bolivian Amazon.
Participants were asked to list all the important men in the village
and say why they were important. Most of the nominations went
to people with formal positions (72%), with the remaining
nominations given due to the nominees’ personal attributes
(12.5%), including being knowledgeable (2.5%). The initial mea-
sure of prestige was the number of nominations due to personal
attributes. The measure of knowledge was ethnobotanical plant
knowledge derived using cultural consensus analysis, i.e., the
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most common response to whether each of 15 plants had med-
icinal properties was considered the correct answer. The results
did not support either of the two predictions: neither ethnobo-
tanical medicinal knowledge nor age were significantly associated
with their measure of prestige.
However, there are several potential explanations for this null
finding. When prestige was measured by the raw number of
nominations instead of only the nominations due to personal
attributes, prestige was positively and significantly associated with
having a formal position the previous year and with being born in
the 1970s. This latter result might be due to the recent increase in
life expectancy in this society, which may have disrupted the
predicted association between prestige and age. Alternatively,
Reyes-Garcia et al. suggest that the training provided by mis-
sionaries to young men to become competent bilinguals (Spanish/
Tsimane) and spread the biblical message gave men born in the
1970s the skills to “navigate between the two worlds” (p. 280).
This might explain their current higher prestige, as opposed to
older men with superior ethnobotanical knowledge.
In the same population, Von Rueden et al. (2008) found a
strong positive association between hunting ability and respect,
i.e., the extent that a person is considered worthy of being
admired, which can be seen as equivalent to H&GW’s prestige.
This supports H&GW’s prediction of a positive correlation
between knowledge/skill and prestige. Nevertheless, hunting is
losing its importance in the studied village due to acculturation
and has no effect on community-wide influence, measured as the
influence of an individual in the resolution of a dispute during a
community-wide meeting. Von Rueden et al. (2008) believe that
the social transformation experienced by the Tsimane society
might explain why hunting skill is correlated with respect but not
with community-wide influence. Conferring respect to people
with highly relevant skills in the past might be a residue of “old-
fashioned” values, but these values do not predict community-
wide influence because these skills are no longer useful. In
Table 1 Predictions about prestige bias derived from the existing literature
Predictions about prestige, success, age and generosity
i) Skilled/knowledgeable individuals are prestigiousa
ii) Older individuals tend to be more prestigious than younger onesa
iii) Generous individuals tend to be prestigiousb
Predictions about behaviours towards knowledgeable/skilful/prestigious individuals
iv) Knowledgeable/skilful/prestigious individuals receive freely conferred deferencea
v) Knowledgeable/skilful/prestigious individuals are paid more attention toa
vi) People seek proximity to knowledgeable/skilful/prestigious individualsa
vii) People preferentially copy knowledgeable/skilful individualsa,c
Predictions about prestige and social learning
viii) People preferentially copy prestigious over non-prestigious individualsa
ix) When success information is absent or difficult to assess, people preferentially copy prestigious individualsd
x) The use of prestige-biased social learning is more frequent in younger people or people with lack of experience in a given domaine
xi) Prestigious individuals are influential/copied, even beyond their domain of expertisea
a(Henrich and Gil-White, 2001)
b(Henrich, 2016)
c(Boyd and Richerson, 1985)
d(Atkisson et al., 2012)
e(Little et al., 2015)
Table 2 Predictions about prestige bias derived from the present review
Predictions about prestige and success (Section ‘Prestige, competence, and age')
i) Prestigious individuals tend to be successful either in currently important domains for a social group or in domains which were valued in the recent
past
ii) Prestigious individuals only achieve social influence when their domain of prestige is currently valued for a social group
iii) The positive association between perceived success within a domain and prestige will be higher than the positive association between actual
success within the same domain and prestige
Predictions about prestige and age (Section ‘Prestige, competence, and age')
iv) The association between age and prestige is stronger for domains in which there is no clear evidence of success
v) Older individuals tend to be prestigious in stable environments, while younger individuals tend to be prestigious in rapidly changing environments
vi) A positive relationship between age and prestige only holds for ages prior reaching the peak on skill. Beyond that point the age-prestige
relationship will either plateau or decrease depending on the importance of the domain for a social group
Predictions about prestige and social learning (Section ‘Prestige-biased social learning')
vii) The more positively correlated are prestige and success, the more people will use prestige-biased social learning. (Section ‘Prestige and success
biases')
viii) People will use more prestige-biased social learning when the task is relevant and difficult than when the task is irrelevant and easy for them
(Section ‘Comparisons between prestige and content biases')
ix) Prestigious individuals will be copied more when the variation in knowledge/skill within a group is large than when this variation is small (Section
‘Variation in the use of prestige bias with experience and age')
x) Cross-domain prestige bias should occur more when cues are noisy within the tested domain than when these cues are clear (Section ‘Prestige
bias beyond the domain of prestige')
xi) Cross-domain prestige bias should occur when there are domain-general traits like IQ that make people successful across domains (Section
‘Prestige bias beyond the domain of prestige')
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contrast, currently relevant skills (e.g., formal education and
Spanish fluency) within this society were significant predictors of
community-wide influence (see predictions (i–ii) in Table 2).
These authors also found an inverted-U-shaped relationship
between age and each of four measures of high rank (success in a
physical confrontation, getting one’s way in the group,
community-wide influence and respect).
Henrich and Henrich (2010) found that, as predicted, prestige
(being nominated as a yalewa vuku or ‘wise woman’) was posi-
tively associated with medicinal plant knowledge and age, while
controlling for years of education in Fijian society. However,
medicinal plant knowledge was assessed only indirectly as the
number of nominations of women considered to know the most
about medicinal plants (perceived knowledge), rather than direct
assessments of actual knowledge. In a different study, Henrich
and Broesch (2011) tested the same predictions in three Fijian
villages, although also indirectly. The outcome variable there was
the probability of an individual being selected as a model from
whom to learn in each of three domains (fishing, growing yams
and medicinal plants). Perceived success in another domain
(cross-domain success) was used to measure prestige. The results
supported the prediction of the positive association between
prestige and knowledge/skill in different domains. Nevertheless,
fishing and yam growing success were much better predictors of
prestige (cross-domain success) than plant knowledge. Age was a
significant predictor of being selected as a model from whom to
learn in the domains of growing yams and medicinal plant
knowledge in one of the villages and of fishing and medicinal
plant knowledge in the entire sample. Henrich & Broesch rea-
soned that, because age is an indirect indicator of success, age is a
much more relevant cue in domains such as medicinal plant
knowledge in which there does not exist clear evidence of success
(see prediction (iv) in Table 2). This potential explanation con-
stitutes an important nuance to the original prediction (predic-
tion (ii) in Table 1) by H&GW.
In the Hazda, hunter-gatherers in Tanzania, Stibbard-Hawkes
et al. (2018) found that hunting prestige (measured using photo-
rankings of hunters) positively predicted three measures of actual
hunting success (aim with bow and arrow, pull strength and
knowledge of animal vocalisations) but was uncorrelated with a
fourth measure (visual acuity). These measures were collected by
the researchers by implementing tasks such as an archery contest
or using a digital bow pull scale. Similarly to Von Rueden et al.
(2008), they found an inverted-U-shaped relationship between
age and hunting prestige, and age and hunting success, which
might be consequence of the decline of hunting skill after
reaching peak skill at 40–55 years of age.
While suggestive, most of these studies do not provide clear
evidence to effectively determine whether prestige is positively
associated with knowledge/skill and/or age. The most important
limitation is that all of the studies (except Stibbard-Hawkes et al.,
2018 and von Rouden et al., 2008) used measures of prestige that
cannot be easily equated to H&GW´s original definition of
prestige. The study by Reyes-Garcia et al. (2008) measured the
number of nominations of people who were considered “impor-
tant” within Tsimane villages, which led participants to nominate
people with formal leadership positions. Therefore, it confuses
power and prestige. Similarly, Henrich and Broesch’s (2011)
measure of prestige as cross-domain success is also problematic
because prestige was initially considered to be domain-specific
(H&GW, p. 170), although with some contradictions (“presti-
gious individuals are influential even beyond the domain of
expertise”, H&GW, p. 184). Another limitation of some of these
studies (Henrich and Broesch, 2011; Henrich and Henrich, 2010)
is the use of perceived success instead of assessing success directly
using objective measures as in the study by Stibbard-Hawkes
et al., 2018. Although perceived success and prestige within a
domain should be positively correlated given the fact that per-
ceptions of success confer prestige, this does not serve to assess
the adaptive role of prestige bias. In order to be adaptive in the
first place, prestige should positively correlate with actual success
(see prediction (iii) in Table 2). Using the most common answer
as a measure of correct knowledge (Reyes-Garcia et al., 2008) is
also problematic, as the most frequent answer might be wrong.
To sum up, it is difficult to convincingly say whether there
exists an association between prestige and knowledge/skill, and
prestige and age. Future research should use better defined, or
more direct and relevant, measures of prestige. However, the
reviewed studies are useful for refining the research agenda. For
example, the inverted U-shaped relationship between prestige and
age found by Von Rueden et al. (2008) and Stibbard-Hawkes
et al., 2018 is more plausible than a linear relationship if prestige
is correlated with skill and there is a decline in physical and
cognitive abilities with older age (see H&GW p. 182, Supple-
mentary Materials in Henrich and Henrich, 2010, p. 4, and pre-
diction (vi) in Table 2). Moreover, older age might be an
inefficient cue of prestige in societies where traditional skills/
knowledge have decreased in importance and new skills have
become more important for the community (e.g., speaking
Spanish to deal with the outside world in Tsimane society, or
computer skills in postindustrial technological society). Conse-
quently, older age is a relevant cue of prestige only when the
environment changes at a relatively slow rate, such that the
correlation between prestige and knowledge is stable across cul-
tural generations (Henrich, 2016). Rapid environmental change,
however, disrupts the positive correlation between valuable
knowledge and age as it leads to “a high rate of informational
obsolescence” (Maxwell and Silverman, 1970, p. 388), which
might even lead to prestige being conferred on to younger indi-
viduals (Spisak et al. 2014; see prediction (v) in Table 2).
Prestige cues
To select the best models from whom to learn, social learners can
directly assess the competence of different models within a valued
domain. For instance, seeing a model successfully hunting large
prey or scoring several goals during a football match leads the
social learner to infer that the model is successful within those
domains. Of course, their success on one day might not be a
reliable indicator of their general, sustained success within a
domain, but the social learner can update this information when
more information is provided (e.g., the results of the next hunting
expedition or football match). Nevertheless, assessing competence
through this procedure may be costly and noisy. Instead, social
learners can use short-cuts either by making inferences from the
appearance, personality, material possessions, etc. of the models,
which we called first-order cues, or by relying on the behaviours of
other social learners towards the models, which we called second-
order cues. Both types of cues can be cheap ways to acquire
valuable information, although they can also lead to useless or
maladaptive behaviour.
First-order cues. The basis for the usefulness of first-order cues is
that these short-cuts are usually positively associated with com-
petence within valuable domains and/or confer prestige due to
their close relationship with competence. For instance, the age of
a model can be used to infer knowledge and skill as older indi-
viduals generally have more experience within a valued domain
and, therefore, they can usually provide higher quality informa-
tion. This cue is especially used and useful for young children as it
is less cognitively demanding than other cues such as professed
knowledge (Wood et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the usefulness of
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using age to socially learn depends on the social context and the
pace of environmental change (see Section ‘Prestige, competence,
and age').
Generosity has also been linked to prestige (prediction (iii) in
Table 1) in experiments (e.g., Flynn et al. 2006; Halevy et al. 2012;
Hardy and Van Vugt, 2006; Willer, 2009) and ethnographic
observations (e.g., Konečná and Urlacher, 2017; Price, 2003;
Radcliffe-Brown, 1964). Because prestigious individuals tend to
be both competent and generous (Cheng and Tracy, 2014; Cheng
et al. 2010; Henrich, 2016), at least towards members of their
ingroup, generosity can be used as a proxy for competence.
According to H&GW, this link is probably due to the fact that
providing public goods is an excellent way to signal competence
and, therefore, to receive further deference, which might be
translated into fitness gains. Nevertheless, wealth is often
inherited and, therefore, the relationship between being generous
(e.g., providing private and public goods to other people) and
being competent does not always hold. Moreover, generosity
might be valued independently to competence (Bai, 2016) due to
the direct benefits (e.g., private and public goods) provided to the
group.
The self-assessment of one’s ability, which if positive can lead
to high self-confidence, is often used as a proxy for competence.
In fact, assertive and confident individuals tend to be granted
higher social rank within groups (Anderson and Kilduff, 2009b).
Although confidence is likely to be associated with competence in
many circumstances (e.g., people who do not know about a topic
cannot usually communicate their knowledge about it effectively),
copying or conferring high social rank to overconfident models
(i.e., models who overestimate their knowledge) might not be the
best strategy, as other models will outperform them in reality.
Similarly, pride displays, which generally occur after an achieve-
ment, are often proxies for competence and social rank (Tracy
et al., 2013). Nevertheless, the actual relationship with compe-
tence might depend on the type of pride display (i.e., authentic vs.
hubristic pride, see Cheng et al., 2010). Similarly, job titles within
appreciated domains (e.g., doctor) and academic titles conferred
by leading universities (e.g., Oxford or Harvard) also act as
prestige cues (Burris, 2004; Dalmaso et al., 2012) in post-
industrial societies. The same can be said for possessing wealth
(Cheng and Tracy, 2013), prestige goods (Plourde, 2008) and
wearing particular types of clothing such as suits (Bickman, 1971;
DeWall and Maner, 2008; Maner et al., 2008). Nevertheless, it is
necessary to emphasise that the identification of these cues as
prestige cues has a subjective component because they depend on
the values of the social learners and their social group. For
instance, wearing a suit might be an inadequate cue of prestige
within the punk rock scene, while having a multicolour Mohawk
can be used as a prestige cue within this subculture. Likewise, a
successful footballer might not be considered prestigious within a
group of people who do not like football, as football is not a
valuable domain for them. Consequently, research using first-
order prestige cues should ensure that these cues are relevant for
the participants.
In summary, although first-order cues have the clear advantage
of being less cognitively demanding than assessing the success of
a model directly, they are prone to be unreliable for two reasons.
First, the relationship of some of these cues (e.g., age, or job titles)
with competence depends on the task, context and/or rate of
ecological and social environmental change. Second, some self-
generated first-order cues (e.g., confidence) are open to cheating
or deception, especially when prestigious individuals receive
material or other benefits. Nevertheless, generosity is a self-
generated first-order cue which is especially difficult to fake
(Barclay, 2013).
Second-order cues. According to H&GW, individuals give freely
conferred deference, pay more attention, seek proximity to, and
copy, competent individuals (predictions (iv–vii) in Table 1).
Consequently, social learners can use the behaviours of other
individuals towards the models to select models from whom to
learn. These second-order cues have the advantage of being
considerably more difficult to fake and of being regularly updated.
The voluntary payment of costs (freely-conferred deference) in
exchange for access to prestigious models (prediction (iv) in
Table 1) is a central aspect of H&GW’s theory. H&GW argue that
prestigious individuals are respected, receive unsolicited help, and
are freed from some social obligations because social learners use
these deference displays to try to grant themselves (not
necessarily consciously) preferential access to prestigious indivi-
duals to gain valuable social learning opportunities. This
preferential access to the models is important as many different
skills contribute to the success of a model within a valued domain.
H&GW gave the example of the potential factors involved in
hunting success such as being good at making bows, aiming,
tracking and approaching prey, as well as more indirect factors
such as sleeping well or having an appropriate diet to maintain
good eyesight. (Note, however, that if many people show
deference to the same individual, the probability of gaining social
learning opportunities would be small. Therefore, the adaptive
value of paying deference to a highly deferred demonstrator
might be minimal.)
Although the study was not conceived to test H&GW’s
prediction, van der Vegt et al. (2006) found that students who
self-perceived themselves as having low expertise carrying out a
research project within four-person groups were more committed
(measured with items like “I am very committed to maintain my
relationship with X”) and provide more help (measured with
items like “I assist X with difficult assignments, even when
assistance is not directly requested”; “I help X when s/he is
running behind in his/her work activities”) to individuals
perceived as experts within their group. Consistent with
H&GW’s prediction, this suggests that deference (helping and
commitment) was provided towards perceived experts to
incentivise their contribution to the group task and receive help
from those experts. Importantly, this reciprocity in the exchange
of help and commitment between members with high and low
expertise was associated with higher performance in the task. This
highlights the adaptive nature of this exchange, which has also
been shown theoretically by Panchanathan (2010). Experimental
evidence has also shown that high prestige individuals are paid
more attention than low prestige individuals (Cheng et al., 2013;
Dalmaso et al., 2014; Dalmaso et al., 2012; DeWall and Maner,
2008; Foulsham et al., 2010; Gerpott et al., 2018; Maner et al.,
2008; Ratcliff et al., 2011) and that successful individuals tend to
be copied (Atkisson et al. 2012; Burdett et al. 2016; McElreath
et al., 2008; Mesoudi, 2008; Wood et al., 2013), which provide
support for H&GW’s predictions about attention (prediction (v))
and copying (prediction (vii) in Table 1). This makes deferential,
attentional and copying cues reliable cues to infer the prestige of
an individual in a social group.
To our knowledge, no research has looked directly at the
proximity-management strategies of social learners towards high
prestige individuals. However, experimental research with
WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich and Democratic,
see Henrich et al., 2010) samples shows that prestige positively
predicts being liked (Brand and Mesoudi, 2018; Cheng et al.,
2013), and preferred as a holiday companion, business partner,
neighbour (Kruger and Fitzgerald, 2011) and long-term mate
(Kruger and Fitzgerald, 2011; Snyder et al., 2008). This provides
tentative support for H&GW’s prediction on proximity-
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management towards prestigious individuals (prediction (vi) in
Table 1). However, it is possible that this proximity-management
might be motivated by other concerns (e.g., coalitional support)
than social learning, which is necessary for supporting H&GW’s
model. Furthermore, the ethnographical record shows little
support for the assumption (prediction (viii) in Table 1) that
underpins all these predictions, that is the preferential copying of
what prestigious individuals do (Garfield et al., 2018). Never-
theless, this absence of evidence might be motivated by the lack of
interest of earlier anthropologists in social learning.
Prestige-biased social learning
Prestige and success biases. H&GW predict that prestigious
individuals are preferentially copied, which is known as prestige
bias (prediction (viii) in Table 1). Importantly, this prediction
should only hold when both individual learning and the direct
assessment of knowledge/skill of a model are costly or difficult.
When the acquisition of knowledge/skill through individual
learning is relatively cheap, the use of prestige bias (or social
learning in general) is less useful. Similarly, when information
about the success of individuals is directly available, people
should use this information to select models (success bias) rather
than prestige (prediction (ix) in Table 1).
Consequently, Atkisson et al. (2012) compared prestige and
success biases in the laboratory. Participants played a computer-
based task in which they designed virtual arrowheads over a series
of trials (see Mesoudi, 2008; Mesoudi and O’Brien, 2008).
Participants could improve their arrowhead by either individual
or social learning. There were three hunting seasons. Prestige
information (time spent by each of the participants looking at the
arrowheads designed by each of the four other participants) was
provided to participants throughout the experiment. Success
information (score of the four different individuals who used
different arrowheads) was only provided in season three. The
results supported the prediction about the use of prestige bias:
prestige information increased the likelihood of an arrowhead
being copied during seasons one and two compared to the other
arrowheads. In contrast, the results did not support the prediction
about the replacement of prestige bias by success bias when both
success and prestige information are available: prestige and
success cues were used similarly during season three, even though
prestige was not correlated with success in the experiment.
This experiment provides convincing evidence for prestige bias.
Nevertheless, it is not clear why participants used prestige and
success cues in a similar way in season three. Atkisson et al.
(2012) argue that participants use prestige cues to socially learn in
their everyday life and this extends to their behaviour in the
laboratory. It is also possible that success needs to be observed
over longer periods of time to replace prestige bias. Alternatively,
perhaps participants were over-trained to use prestige cues in
seasons one to two and carried this into season three. A
replication adding a second condition, in which success cues are
provided during seasons one to two, might clarify this. We might
expect participants to learn more easily that success cues are
superior to prestige cues in this case. Finally, it would be
interesting to systematically manipulate the correlation between
prestige and success, to see whether prestige cues are only used
when prestige is positively correlated with success (see prediction
(vii) in Table 2).
Variation in the use of prestige bias with experience and age.
Exploratory analyses by Atkisson et al. (2012) showed that the use
of prestige and success biases was greater when participants
performed badly in the previous three trials. Another circum-
stance that might prompt greater use of these biases is the lack of
previous experience within a domain. Consequently, the lower
level of experience of younger people compared to older people
might make younger people more prone to copy prestigious/
successful individuals (prediction (x) in Table 1).
Little et al. (2015) tested this prediction in the domain of mate
choice. In an initial experiment, female participants rated the
attractiveness of young, artificially-created male faces paired with
female faces with different degrees of prestige, which was
manipulated by presenting a numeric score of popularity. As
predicted (prediction (viii) in Table 1), model popularity
positively predicted ratings of male face attractiveness. Moreover,
older participants were less likely to be influenced by the
popularity of the models than younger participants, consistent
with the prediction that prestige bias should vary with experience/
age. However, a limitation of this experiment is that the male
faces being rated were all very young. Given evidence that women
are less attracted to men who are considerably younger than
themselves than men who are of similar age or older (Buss, 1989;
Buunk et al. 2001; Schwarz and Hassebrauck, 2012), this may
explain the age effect rather than experience. This was addressed
by Little et al. in a subsequent experiment, which used real
photographs and in which three age groups were used for both
participants (16–25, 26–32, 32–61) and stimuli (18–25, 26–32,
32–40). Again as predicted, model popularity positively predicted
the ratings of attractiveness for the younger group (16–25 years
old) but not for the older groups of participants (25–32, 32–61).
Nevertheless, the problem remained: a considerable number of
participants in the oldest group (M= 41.6, SD= 8.1) were still
rating exclusively much younger male faces than themselves.
Consequently, the interpretation of the findings requires similar
caution. Moreover, the effect size was more than double for the
interaction between age of the face and participants’ age
(ηp2= 0.10) than for the interaction between model popularity
and participants’ age (ηp2= 0.04). This suggests that rather than
experience-dependent prestige bias, Little et al.’s findings can be
explained by the congruency between age of faces and age of
participants. Further experiments should ensure that the stimuli
are maximally relevant for the participants.
Contrary to Little et al.’s prediction, the two-stage social
learning model (Henrich and Broesch, 2011; Henrich and
Henrich, 2010; Kline et al., 2013) predicts a greater use of
prestige bias with age/experience. As there exists a trade-off
between the access costs to different models and the fitness-
enhancing information that can be acquired from the models,
social learners should first learn from low access cost models (e.g.,
relatives, neighbours, friends) and later further improve their
knowledge/skill by copying prestigious and/or successful models.
This updating process would be more noticeable when there is
large variation in knowledge/skill within a given domain so that
social learners would benefit more from copying high competence
models using success or prestige cues. When the variation is
small, most social learners would not copy successful/prestigious
models because much of the information they can learn from
them is shared by almost everyone in the social group and,
therefore, they can learn fitness-enhancing knowledge/skills from
low access cost models instead (Henrich and Henrich, 2010; see
prediction (ix) in Table 2). Mathematical models that include a
combination of vertical and oblique transmission have shown
that, if some members of each generation use model-based biases
(e.g., prestige bias, success bias), fitness-enhancing knowledge/
skills will spread in a population over generations, leading to the
emergence of cultural adaptation (Boyd and Richerson, 1985;
Henrich, 2004; Powell et al., 2009). This gives plausibility to the
adaptive value of the two-stage social learning model.
This pattern seems to be the case in the transmission of
adaptive food taboos related to pregnancy and breastfeeding in
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Fijian villages. According to Henrich and Henrich (2010), the
pattern of transmission is mainly from older (i.e., mothers, grand-
mothers, mothers-in-law) to younger (i.e., daughters, grand-
daughter, daughters-in-law) female relatives. Nevertheless, a
substantial minority (almost 25%) of participants in this study
reported to have learnt the taboos from the yalewa vuku (wise
women, who were equated to prestigious individuals), or the
elders (almost 33%). Although this gives tentative support for the
emergence of cultural adaptation through a combination of
vertical and oblique transmission, it is not clear whether prestige-
biased transmission was greater at an older than a younger age.
The acquisition of relevant skills for wild honey collecting among
male Jenu Kuruba in South India also seems to follow the two-
stage social learning model. According to Demps et al. (2012),
most honey collecting knowledge/skill is acquired in this
population at younger ages: most people reported to learn tree
climbing at six to nine years old, making a smoky torch at 10–15
years old, and cutting honey combs at 16–21 years old.
Importantly, most of the knowledge/skills were learnt from
relatives (fathers, brothers, and elder kin) but learning from
successful individuals and co-workers became more important
with age. Nevertheless, the two-stage social learning model is not
specific to the use of prestige cues (see Lucas et al., 2016 for
further discussion and experimental evidence).
Prestige bias and overimitation. If prestige bias is especially
likely to be used when success is difficult to directly assess (see
Section ‘Social learning and the evolution of prestige'), people
should copy irrelevant actions carried out by prestigious indivi-
duals when the link between each action and success in the task is
not clear for them. Experiments on overimitation, the tendency to
copy irrelevant actions to obtain a reward, have looked at whether
younger children overimitate high social rank models. McGuigan
(2013) conducted an experiment in which five year olds viewed
videos with one of four models with high or low social rank
performing irrelevant actions (e.g., removing a bolt) and relevant
actions (e.g., extracting the sticker with the tool) to obtain a
sticker from a transparent box. The high social rank models were
the participants’ head and class teacher. The low social rank
models were a familiar model (a researcher who had carried out
research with the children during the previous week) and an
unfamiliar model (a totally unacquainted individual for the
children). As predicted, children copied irrelevant actions sig-
nificantly more when they came from the high social rank models
than from the low social rank models. Nevertheless, pairwise
comparisons only found significant differences between the head
teacher and both low rank models. Moreover, the copying of
relevant actions was not affected by models’ rank. Alternative
factors, rather than prestige, might account for the results, as the
high rank models were also more familiar to the children and
held a position of authority over them.
In contrast, Chudek et al. (2016) obtained findings that cast
doubt on importance of model-based biases in overimitation.
Children aged two to seven years viewed videos with two female
adult models trying to obtain stickers from a puzzle box. In one
condition, the models had low or high prestige, which was
manipulated by showing two individuals carefully looking at the
actions performed by one model (high prestige) while ignoring the
actions of the other model (low prestige). In another condition, the
models had high or low success, which was manipulated by the
models either saying they obtained five (high success) or zero (low
success) stickers. While overimitation generally increased with age,
there was no selectivity at any age: the children were equally likely
to overimitate successful and unsuccessful, and prestigious and non-
prestigious, models. Importantly, these negative results were found
using models who were not familiar to the children and who did
not have a position of authority over them, suggesting that these
factors might have driven the selective overimitation in McGuigan’s
(2013) experiment.
Prestige bias beyond the domain of prestige. H&GW predict
that prestigious individuals are influential beyond their domain of
expertise (prediction (xi) in Table 1). This prediction is based on
the following assumption: as it is difficult or costly to identify the
factors that make someone successful within a valued domain,
natural selection should have favoured a general-copying bias
towards the prestigious, in the hope that at least one of the many
characteristics that are copied are causally related to success. For
instance, many factors might lead to being a successful hunter
(tracking skill, ability and materials use to make bows, sleeping
well, etc.) and, consequently, a general copying bias of all of these
traits associated with the prestigious might be adaptive, at the
occasional cost of copying neutral or maladaptive traits (e.g.,
wearing a magic charm, or being tattooed). This general social
learning bias towards prestigious individuals might help to
explain why the opinions of prestigious individuals within a given
domain (e.g., acting or singing in Western society or hunting in a
foraging society) are influential in other domains (e.g., Arnocky
et al. 2018; Jackson and Darrow, 2005; Lee, 1979, p. 343; Rad-
cliffe-Brown, 1964, p. 64; Smith and Bird, 2000). Another pos-
sibility not considered by H&GW is that there exist domain-
general traits that are likely to lead to success in multiple
domains, such as having an inner locus of control, intrinsic
motivation, general intelligence/IQ, or being perseverant and self-
disciplined. These domain-general traits might explain in part the
success of some celebrities such as Will Smith (acting, rapping) or
Arnold Schwarzenegger (bodybuilding, acting, politics) across
multiple domains (although being famous itself may also have
helped them to achieve success in other domains). Nevertheless, a
cross-domain social learning bias towards the prestigious might
sometimes cause the acquisition of maladaptive information and,
consequently, it should be expected that the influence of presti-
gious individuals is larger within their domain of prestige.
To test this, Chudek et al. (2012) conducted two studies with
three to four years olds. The manipulation of prestige involved
varying the degree of attention that two different models received
from other individuals. The models then showed a preference for
one of two foods, drinks, artefacts or labels for novel objects.
Afterwards, children’s preferences for the same item pairs were
tested. The results for the first study supported prestige-biased
social learning (prediction (viii) in Table 1), as children were
more likely to share the preferences of the prestigious model over
the non-prestigious model. The second study in which the models
displayed preferences only in one of two domains (food or
artefacts) also provided support for the prestige-biased social
learning hypotheses, but confined within the domain of prestige.
That is, children followed the preference of the prestigious model
only for the specific domain in which they saw that model exhibit
preferences. Consequently, this study did not provide support for
H&GW’s prediction of cross-domain prestige-biased social
learning. Future studies might benefit from studying more
directly the two aforementioned mechanisms that favour cross-
domain prestige bias, as they make specific and as-yet untested
predictions. From the first mechanism (general copying bias) it
follows that cross-domain prestige bias should occur when cues
are noisy within the tested domain (see prediction (x) in Table 2).
From the second mechanism (cross-domain general ability) it
follows that cross-domain prestige bias should occur when there
are domain-general traits like IQ that make people successful
across domains (see prediction (xi) in Table 2).
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Comparisons between prestige and content biases. Although
theoretically prestige biased social learning is generally adaptive,
so are other social learning biases, and it is instructive to compare
people’s use of prestige bias relative to other biases. Acerbi and
Tehrani (2018) conducted two studies that compare the strength
of content and prestige in cultural transmission. Content biases
occur when certain types of material are preferentially trans-
mitted, in contrast to model-based biases such as prestige bias
where characteristics of the model are used. Acerbi and Tehrani
(2018) chose the topic of quotations because it is a domain in
which both content (the message of the quote) and prestige (e.g.,
frequent misattribution of quotes to famous people) are relevant.
First, participants rated a series of unattributed quotes for their
likeability, i.e., content. Then, they tested whether quotes asso-
ciated with famous (i.e., prestigious) individuals (e.g., Vincent
Van Gogh) were more liked than the same quotes associated with
non-famous individuals invented by the researchers (e.g., Win-
ston Perkins). The results showed no statistical difference in
liking ratings between quotes associated with the high and low
prestige individuals. Instead, liking was significantly predicted by
the original likeability ratings of the quotes when unattributed.
This suggests that the content of the quotations is more impor-
tant than the attributed authorship of the quotation.
Acerbi and Tehrani argue that the lack of evidence for prestige
bias in their study might have been because the task did not
require any kind of expertise. Furthermore, participants did not
obtain higher or lower rewards for preferring some quotations
over others. Consequently, the use of prestige bias was not useful
here as participants could easily assess the likability of the quotes
by themselves without any cost (see prediction (viii) in Table 2).
Alternatively, people might have assumed that the “low prestige”
names were “high prestige” too but that they had not heard of
them before.
As was argued in section ‘Variation in the use of prestige bias
with experience and age', the usefulness of prestige bias (and
social learning in general) should depend on people’s expertise.
When people lack experience within a given domain, they should
benefit more from using prestige cues to select models from
whom to learn (prediction (ix) in Table 1). However, the opposite
can also be true, i.e., prestige bias is used more by those with high
expertise, when the domain is more relevant for experts than
non-experts, and when the task is more difficult for experts than
non-experts. This is what Verpooten and Dewitte (2017) found
for the appreciation of modern art. Like Acerbi and Tehrani, they
used a subjective task in which there was no objective correct or
incorrect answer. Laypeople and art experts were shown portraits
of female faces, which varied in attractiveness (moderate vs. high
attractiveness). In one condition, participants were shown these
pictures without any additional information. In another condi-
tion, participants were told that the pictures belonged to a
collection of a prestigious museum in New York (MoMA). As
predicted, laypeople’s appreciation was guided by the content of
the pictures, showing more appreciation for the highly attractive
faces than the moderately attractive faces with little influence of
the prestige manipulation. As was also predicted, experts showed
more appreciation for the pictures associated with the prestigious
museum. This relationship was mediated by admiration towards
the artists, which is consistent with H&GW’s theory (see Section
‘Social learning and the evolution of prestige'). Surprisingly, they
also found that experts appreciated more the moderately
attractive faces than the highly attractive faces. In another study,
Verpooten (2018) used real artworks from MoMA, which
depicted animate (e.g., pig) or inanimate (e.g., chair) objects.
According to evolutionary psychologists (New et al., 2007),
people have an evolved preference for animate over inanimate
objects, which the authors predicted would guide the behaviour of
non-experts. Consistent with this, there was an overall preference
for animate over inanimate objects. Again, however, this was
moderated by expertise. The greater the expertise of the
participants, the less the participants appreciated the animate
over the inanimate artworks, to the extent the preferences
reversed in the top experts. Verpooten and Dewitte (2017),
inspired by previous work (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Prum,
2013), argue that the experts’ deviations in artwork preferences
from evolved aesthetic preferences might be due to a runaway
process analogous to a runway sexual selection in which the trait
(here, artworks) coevolves with preferences within a population
of art experts.
Although the research covered in this section is interesting
with respect to the general phenomenon of prestige, it is not clear
how the likability of quotes or artworks is related to social
learning. Although a greater appreciation of a cultural item
probably leads to the greater transmissibility of that item, this
may not always be the case. Disgust-inducing information, for
instance, is not particularly liked, yet several studies have shown
that it has a transmission advantage (Eriksson and Coultas, 2014;
Heath et al., 2001; Miton et al., 2015), at least, in WEIRD samples
(Eriksson et al., 2016). For instance, an offensive comment on
Twitter (e.g., one that is overtly racist) or Marcel Duchamp’s
Fountainmight be disgusting and be disliked by many people, but
this in itself could contribute to these items’ greater transmission
by commenting on them or drawing attention to them. Future
studies should test the differential effects of the content of the
information and the prestige associated to the source by designing
experiments that measure transmission in a more direct way
using, for instance, experimental paradigms such as transmission
chains (Bartlett, 1932; Mesoudi, 2007) and choose-to-transmit
(Eriksson and Coultas, 2014; Heath et al., 2001; Stubbersfield
et al., 2014) and choose-to-receive (Eriksson and Coultas, 2014;
Stubbersfield et al., 2014) methods.
Final remarks and future directions. In this article, we have
reviewed the evidence amassed for the adaptiveness and use of
prestige bias in human adults and children since the publication
of H&GW’s influential paper and suggested new predictions and
research questions (see Table 2). Although H&GW predicted that
prestige is positively correlated with both skill/knowledge within
valued domains and age (predictions (i–ii) in Table 1), the specific
tests of these claims inspired by H&GW’s theory suggest a more
complex picture. Above all, the positive association between
prestige and both knowledge/skill and age heavily depends on the
stability of the social and ecological environment. When there is
rapid social change, the skills/knowledge that were important and
valuable in the past might not be any longer. Nevertheless, people
might still confer prestige according to old-fashioned values,
which would disrupt the predicted positive correlation between
prestige and knowledge/skill. Alternatively, people might confer
prestige according to new values that confer importance to the
skills that are relevant nowadays. In this case, if the researchers
measure the correlation between prestige and a particular domain
of knowledge/skill that has lost its importance within a society,
the predicted positive association between prestige and knowl-
edge/skill would be disrupted (see predictions (i–iii) in Table 2).
The same can be said about the predicted positive correlation
between prestige and age. Age is a good cue of knowledge/skill
when the social and ecological environment is relatively stable
and life expectancy does not go much beyond an age at which the
degradation of cognitive and physical skills starts. When there is
rapid environmental change, older age might be an inadequate
cue to select models from whom to learn and sometimes even
younger models might be preferred. Moreover, the degradation of
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cognitive and physical skills with age might moderate the positive
association between age and knowledge/skill and favour a plateau
or a decline at older age. Future research should explore how
social and ecological change and the age-dependency in skill/
knowledge within different domains affects the association
between prestige, knowledge/skill and age (see predictions (v–vi)
in Table 2).
The evidence reviewed in this article provides mixed support
for the use of prestige-biased social learning in both human adults
and children. However, few studies have examined this and
further research is needed to clarify which factors lead to
variation in the use of prestige-biased social learning. The
difficulty of the task, the relevance of the domain for the
individuals and the benefits and costs associated with the task
seem to be important factors influencing the use of prestige-
biased social learning (see prediction (viii) in Table 2). In general,
easy tasks, tasks that are not relevant for participants and tasks
that do not provide incentives to perform well or avoid costs (e.g.,
monetary rewards or costs) seem not to stimulate the use of
prestige-biased social learning (Acerbi and Tehrani, 2018). Other
factors taken into account in the literature, such as experience and
age (Little et al., 2015) seem to be important when they affect task
difficulty, the relevance of the domain for the participants and
potential gains or costs of the task for the participants. For
instance, expertise leads to a greater use of prestige-biased social
learning when the task is more relevant for the experts but the
task is still difficult for them (Verpooten and Dewitte, 2017).
Similarly, younger individuals use more prestige-biased social
learning than older individuals when the task is more relevant for
them (Little et al., 2015). Moreover, when there is little variation
in knowledge/skill in a group, it is more adaptive to learn from
low access cost models than from costly prestigious models
(Henrich and Henrich, 2010; see prediction (ix) in Table 2).
Another factor that influences the use of prestige-biased social
learning is the availability of alternative social learning biases, e.g.,
success or content biases. When success information is provided,
this information should be preferentially used over prestige
information (prediction (ix) in Table 1). However, this was not
found in the sole experiment comparing prestige with success bias
(Atkisson et al., 2012), although this is a single study. Both direct
and conceptual replications are needed to gain confidence in this
result. Content bias was stronger than prestige bias in another
study (Acerbi and Tehrani, 2018), but this might depend on the
domain and the factors mentioned above (i.e., task difficulty,
relevance for the individual, and benefits and costs associated
with the task). Variation in some of these factors (e.g., the
relevance for the participants) might lead some participants (e.g.,
non-experts) to make use of content biases, while other
participants (e.g., experts) to employ prestige-biased social
learning (Verpooten and Dewitte, 2017).
It is also possible that prestige biased social learning has
different effects on different measures of influence, e.g., recall,
likability, behavioural influence, willingness to transmit and
receive information. To the extent these measures of influence
affect task difficulty, relevance for the participants or the benefits/
costs associated with tasks, it seems plausible that the different
measures would be a source of variation in the use of prestige and
other social learning biases. For instance, although one recent
study found that anti-vaccination messages are not better
transmitted per se, exploratory analyses showed that when anti-
vaccination messages are provided by doctors (i.e., a prestigious
source within a relevant domain) these types of messages are
especially powerful in influencing people’s vaccination-related
decisions (Jiménez et al., 2018). Similarly, although people might
be able to appreciate the content of certain pieces of information
(e.g., quotes, news, artworks, etc.) independent of the prestige of
the source of the information, they might be more influenced by
prestige cues when they want to achieve influence over other
people’s behaviour (e.g., by quoting a prestigious source of
information), get personal or social benefits (e.g., choosing
artworks to be displayed in their own town) or they have to
decide whether to learn more about a topic or transmit the
information about the topic to other people. Therefore, research
on prestige-biased social learning might benefit from comparing
the influence of prestige cues on different types of outcomes.
Although H&GW predicted that prestige-biased social learning
is cross-domain such that prestige in one domain bleeds across to
other domains (prediction (xi) in Table 1), the only experiment
testing this hypothesis found that prestige-biased social learning
is stronger within domains (Chudek et al., 2012). Nevertheless,
anecdotal evidence (e.g., the influence of the opinions of
celebrities in domains in which they are not experts) suggests
that cross-domain prestige-biased social learning occurs to some
extent. In small-scale societies, it is likely that prestigious
individuals are relatively skilful/knowledgeable across multiple
domains and, consequently, a cross-domain prestige bias would
be adaptive (Acerbi, 2016), albeit leading to the occasional
acquisition of irrelevant or even maladaptive information.
However, the risks of cross-domain prestige-biased social
learning seem considerably higher in the digital era in which,
for example, young people in developing countries might be more
influenced by American pop singers, Hollywood celebrities or
leaders of terrorist groups than by the nearby adults who have
relevant skills for their environment (Barkow et al., 2012).
Consequently, studying to what extent the digital media have
subverted the adaptive role of prestige-biased social learning
seems a productive new avenue for research on prestige and social
learning (Acerbi, 2016; Barkow et al., 2012).
H&GW predicted that information provided by prestigious
individuals is more memorable, but this question has not been
studied yet. If H&GW are correct and prestige-based hierarchies
evolved to select fitness-enhancing models from whom to learn,
prestige-biased social learning should strongly affect human
memory. However, it is possible that the effects of prestige on
memory are just the consequence of the preferential attention
that prestigious individuals receive (see Section ‘Second-order
cues'). Therefore, studies exploring how prestige cues affect
memory should look at how differential attention towards
prestigious and non-prestigious individuals affects memorability
(e.g., by using eye-tracking).
In conclusion, H&GW’s theory of the evolution of prestige has
generated a great deal of research and this research has stimulated
new research questions and predictions. Although the evidence
reviewed here suggest that prestige-bias social learning is
employed in at least some contexts, further research will need
to determine the precise circumstances in which people use
prestige cues to learn socially, and when the use of these cues is
adaptive.
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Notes
1 In reality, H&GW use the word “status”. We prefer the word “social rank” as there is
an emerging consensus in the literature to use social status and prestige as synonyms
(e.g., Anderson et al. 2015; Cheng and Tracy, 2014) or as closely related terms (e.g.,
Blader and Chen, 2014)
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